These range from the Marxist Burnhamite view of the rise of the manager (Burnham, 1942) to the sociological power-dependence approach popular in the 1960s and 1970s (Crozier and Friedberg, 1981), in which the power position of the bureaucrat arose from the dependence of the politician on the expertise of the bureaucrat, through to the neo-Marxist arguments of the 1970s and 1980s where, according to Nicos A. The same basic point, that specialist knowledge gives the bureaucrat power over those generalist politicians who are meant to give them direction, has been recast in different ways over the years by different brands of social science theorising. Thompson’s (1961) argument that managers are inadequately qualified “to control the specialists who work under their control”. Peter Self (1977, p. 204) points to the common belief that hierarchy and specialization are incompatible, exemplified above all in Victor A. The idea of the potential conflict between “generalist” politicians and “specialist” bureaucrats had long been discussed in traditional public administration accounts of bureaucracy (Ridley, 1968 Judge, 1981). Weber makes many qualifications to these observations, and we will come back to these later, the basic idea of a conflict between the expert bureaucrat and the inexpert politician has been a staple of subsequent literature on bureaucracy. Over the longer term the expert Fach-Geheimrat 2 mostly has the upper hand in relation to the inexpert politician” (Weber, 1972, p. 128–129).ĢWhile M. “There is the continual question: who will govern the bureaucratic apparatus? The domination of the apparatus by the non-expert remains only possible to a limited degree. The “specialist trained vortragender Rat 1 is superior in technical matters to the minister” (Weber, 1972, p. 856). “The power position of all bureaucrats rests on knowledge” (Weber, 1972, p. 854–855). For Max Weber the expert, trained bureaucrat is indispensable to modern government and this indispensability leads to the “continually growing power position” of the state bureaucracy in modern politics (Weber, 1972, p. 836). 2 Literally “expert privy councillor” referring to the top official with specialist training.ġFor a long time “expertise” has been considered to be the main basis of bureaucratic power in modern democracies.1 Literally “expert councillor”, a Prussian administrative position reached on the basis of education (.).Max Weber était lui-même ambivalent à propos de l’importance de l’expertise et il est probable que la fonction qu’on lui prête – celle de renforcer les rôles bureaucratiques dans la fabrication des politiques publiques – ait été exagérée. La conclusion d’ensemble est que si les « experts » ont de l’influence, ils le doivent davantage à leur statut qu’au contenu de leur expertise. Dans chaque tableau, la signification de l’expertise comme source d’influence est interrogée. L’expertise est ici définie alternativement comme un savoir scientifique ou comme un savoir pratique lié à une politique publique – connaissance ou expérience toujours propre à un domaine spécifique d’action publique. Les données recueillies y sont présentées sous la forme de trois tableaux décrivant trois situations différentes : le fonctionnaire comme expert le fonctionnaire comme mobilisateur d’expertise le fonctionnaire au service de l’expertise. Cet article examine de manière critique cette proposition sur la base d’une enquête portant sur 52 régulations mises en place dans six États. L’expertise est traditionnellement considérée comme ce qui donne du pouvoir aux fonctionnaires dans les processus de fabrication des politiques publiques.
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